Background
By the eighteenth year of Jian'an (213), Cao Cao was unquestionably the paramount power-holder of the Central Plain. After the northern campaign against the Wuhuan (207), the pacification of the Guanzhong region (211), and the submission of Hanzhong (not yet fully accomplished in this year, but with the situation already showing signs of being manageable), his actual power far exceeded that of any Han chancellor before him — yet nominally he was still Chancellor of the Han court. At this juncture, a critical disagreement surfaced within the Yanzhou–Xudou faction over the question of "whether Cao Cao should be elevated to Duke of Wei and awarded the Nine Bestowments." Dong Zhao pressed the issue from the perspective of a powerful minister ascending further, arguing that Cao Cao's achievements surpassed those of the Duke of Zhou and Lv Wang and should be matched by the appropriate ranks and ceremonies [c:17065]. Xun Yu, standing on the moral ground of a "loyal minister of the Han," held firm in opposition, maintaining that Cao Cao had taken up arms in the first place under the banner of restoring the Han, and that elevation to Duke of Wei with the Nine Bestowments would be a crossing of the line. The collision of these two paths makes this event the most representative "positioning of the powerful minister" node in the political history of the late Han.
Key Figures
The three core figures of the event each represent a distinct political stance. Dong Zhao was the single most important driver of the path toward "the powerful minister ascending further": he excelled at advancing inch by inch along institutional boundaries — previously he had opened up Yang Feng when receiving the emperor at Xudou, and now he was again the first to propose the Duke of Wei and Nine Bestowments, making him the most critical "institutional architect" in the transition from Cao Cao as Han Chancellor to Cao Cao as King of Wei [c:17065]. Cao Cao's own attitude toward this matter was outwardly restrained but substantively supportive: he "changed color with rage" upon hearing Xun Yu's opposition, yet still allowed Dong Zhao to take the lead in drafting the memorial on his behalf, himself maintaining the posture of "being nominated," so that the event presented procedurally as "the collective will of the ministers" rather than "individual usurpation" [c:17066]. Xun Yu embodied the highest commitment of the "loyal minister of the Han" path: he had followed Cao Cao for more than twenty years and was one of the earliest core advisors of the Yanzhou faction, yet on the fundamental question of whether the Han nominal order would survive or perish, he chose not to yield, explicitly stating "A gentleman loves others through virtue — this is not how it should be done" [c:17066]. The tension among the three erupted in full for the first time in this event.
Core Issues
The elevation to Duke of Wei touched on three levels of institutional questions. The first is the special nature of the ducal rank: since the Han dynasty, no subject of a different surname could be enfeoffed as king, and "duke" was an intermediate rank between "marquis" and "king." Elevation to Duke of Wei meant that Cao Cao would possess a nominally independent "state" — the state of Wei — with its own ancestral temple, altars of earth and grain, and official system; this was the critical transition from "minister of the Han" to "lord of Wei." The second is the ritual significance of the Nine Bestowments: in every dynasty, the recipients of the Nine Bestowments had almost invariably been on the verge of usurpation — Wang Mang and Dong Zhuo had both received similar ceremonial treatments, and Cao Cao's acceptance of the Nine Bestowments was politically tantamount to declaring an intention to move toward the supreme position. The third is the use of "the collective will of the ministers" as a cloak of legitimacy: Dong Zhao employed the rhetorical strategy of "how can one person obstruct the will of the multitude?" to frame the proposal for the dukedom and Nine Bestowments as a collective nomination, procedurally overriding Xun Yu's opposition [c:17066]. This political technique of using "the will of the multitude" to suppress "loyal remonstrance" was the standard operating procedure by which late Han power-holders transitioned into founding monarchs.
Political Consequences
The political consequences of the event unfolded across three levels. The first level is institutional: in the fifth month of the eighteenth year of Jian'an, Cao Cao was officially enfeoffed as Duke of Wei, the state of Wei was established with Yecheng as its capital; over the subsequent years, the Wei state's official system, ancestral temple, and altars of earth and grain were set up in succession, producing a "one empire, two courts" structure between the Han court and the Wei state — laying the complete institutional foundation for Cao Pi's later displacement of the Han. The second level is personnel: shortly after lamenting "I never thought I would live to see this day," Xun Yu died of illness at Shouchun (some accounts hold he was compelled by Cao Cao to take his own life) — this landmark event silenced or marginalized nearly everyone in the Yanzhou–Xudou faction who still identified with the Han cause, leaving the power-holder's inner circle with no further internal check [c:17066]. The third level is discursive: from this point onward, Cao Cao was viewed by the late Han gentry-official class as a figure unambiguously and irreversibly committed to displacing the Han; though he himself never declared himself emperor, in political perception he had already been positioned as a founding monarch, and the central evidence for the "treacherous hero" image of him in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms is concentrated heavily in this period.
Counterfactual Analysis
Suppose Cao Cao had rejected Dong Zhao's proposal and maintained the title of "Han Chancellor" until the end — he would not have crossed the "displacing the Han" line during his lifetime, and Cao Pi would have been unable to complete the abdication quickly in 220; the San Guo configuration might have taken shape at a delayed pace. But at the same time, Caowei's internal cohesion would have been affected as well, because without "the state of Wei" as an independent patrimonial entity, the transfer of power would have been far more fragile. Conversely, had Xun Yu not explicitly opposed the move on this occasion but instead supported the elevation alongside Dong Zhao, Cao Cao would have gained not only internal unanimity in institutional advancement but would also have lost the counterpoint of "loyal remonstrance" that was actually favorable to his personal image — Xun Yu's opposition made Cao Cao appear to have been "pushed into it" rather than actively usurping, a narrative repeatedly emphasized in both the Romance and in official history. Finally, had Cao Cao chosen to declare himself king directly, skipping the transitional "Duke of Wei" step, he would have faced a far fiercer backlash and moral controversy; the entire late Han gentry-official support base might have collapsed, and Caowei's displacement of the Han would have been far harder to accomplish. The true significance of the elevation to Duke of Wei therefore lies not in the rank itself, but in the fact that it provided precisely the right institutional staircase for the "powerful minister to founding ruler" transition.